Israel starts WW3

[Sean Pa]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/mid...st/3557601.stm

This will be very Bad. And this a Guy they released some years back

[Emperor Napoleon]

IMO the Muslim world has drawn a line in the sand and peaceful solutions are no longer possible. Israel acted in self-defense. Muslim extremists are no better than fire ants. Ever try to reason with a fire ant? You have to step on them and grind them into the pavement. Too bad the 10th-13th century crusades didn't wipe Islam off the face of the earth....

[cincygreg]

It is quite a powder keg over there, and something like this is sure to ignite some of that powder.

Unfortunately it really looks like a lose lose situation until something gets done by both sides.

[Emperor Napoleon]

True in theory Greg, but there's a small problem: Islamic militants, those who subscribe to "jihad" don't want a peaceful resolution. Every step closer to peace, every conciliatory move Israel makes and some extremist launches another suicide attack. They don't want peaceful co-existence, they proved that in the 1967 "7 Day War". THEY LOST. If they had won there would be no Israel, their collective goal was to "drive Israel into the sea". How does one have a dialogue of peace with such brutes? Will they make an avowal of "revenge" when we catch that sob bin laden? Probably. Filthy, stinking, camel dung eating goat fucking pieces of shit that they are...(sorry Sluggo)

[jumper69]

Why appeasment will not work....

Below is an article sent to me. It is educational to say the least. It is also accurate. The article explains why appeasement does not work. The only thing which will work is to resist and fight back. Yes, it will require sacrifice of life and limbs by those who are the bravest of us. It will require emotional strength and financial sacrifice by the rest of us. The alternative is to leave the problem to those who come after us, at an even greater price of life and way of life. That would be the way of the appeaser, right John "Scary" Kerry?

By Rand H. Fishbein, Ph.D. on Thursday, December 20, 2001 ECHOES FROM THE BARBARY COAST On the day that United Airlines flight 175 and American Airlines flight 11 lifted off from Boston?s Logan airport, bound for a fiery collision with the twin towers of New York?s World Trade Center, a lone observer watched from below. That observer was the U.S.S. Constitution, the oldest commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy and an early witness to the ravages of Middle Eastern terrorism.

Launched in 1797, the U.S.S. Constitution (?Old Ironside? and her sister ship, the U.S.S. Constellation, were built to wage war on the Muslim pirates operating along North Africa?s Barbary coast. It was a wild, untamed region of petty states and warlords whose reach extended deep into the Mediterranean Sea, from Gibralter to the borders of Egypt. Each owed his allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan, who demanded that payment of an annual tribute be made to his treasury in exchange for the protection afforded by his Army. It was a tidy arrangement, one that worked well for the Sultan and those who knew their place in the social order.

That the local rulers were obliged to share a portion of their meager income with Constantinople meant that new, more assured opportunities for profit would have to be found. The solution was piracy.

For nearly four centuries the Barbary states, and the brigands they employed, prowled the Mediterranean in search of prey. The lumbering merchant vessels of the time were no match for the Muslim corsairs, built for speed and lightening strikes. It was a way of life that took its toll on countless merchant ships, most of which were only lightly armed and had little capacity to resist capture.

The crews who fell victim to this banditry were destined, often times, for a miserable fate. After seizing their cargo and scuttling the vessels, the pirates would then ransom the ill-fated seamen back to their sovereign or the company that had chartered them. Usually, though, the victims of these maritime hijackings would languish in fetid prisons, unsure of when, or even if, they would ever be rescued. Some were sold into slavery.

It was a lucrative business, one that yielded great riches not only for the pirates, but also for the Muslim states that gave them refuge. For many of the rulers, plunder became a mainstay of their survival. In the parlance of our time this was state-sponsored terrorism pure and simple -- an extortion racket in which the pirate, the petty states of North Africa and the Ottoman Empire were all complicit.

Not surprisingly, the merchant nations of Europe took a dim view of the Muslim pirates. Even though many had a long tradition of privateering themselves, times were changing, and such practices were now deemed incompatible with a world increasingly dependent on commerce over the high seas. Nowhere was this sentiment expressed more strongly than in America, where a young Congress, flush with a sense of invincibility after the war of Independence, readily took up the challenge.

Having championed the cause of liberty and free trade during years of struggle, members were infuriated that the sovereignty of America?s commercial fleet was not being respected. The Royal Navy no longer patrolled the sea lanes on behalf of the American colonies. United States shipping was now vulnerable as never before; as the cost in lives and property mounted, the government concluded that something had to be done. But what should that something be?

In an effort at peaceful diplomacy, missions were dispatched to the Barbary states of Tripoli, Algiers, Morocco and Tunis with a modest proposal: The U.S. would agree to pay an annual sum to each of the Muslim warlords if they, in turn, would agree to protect American vessels traveling in their waters.

To most of the politicians at the time, this seemed like a perfectly reasonable, if not practical, solution. In the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, the United States had neither the stomach nor the ability to conduct another war, particularly one that would have to be waged so far from American shores. After all, this was the wily Middle East, a region known only to a few intrepid travelers, and plied by adventure-seekers and businessmen for whom kidnapping and ransom was a constant occupational hazard.

Moreover, paying tribute was a time-honored practice shared by both nation states and petty kingdoms, alike. A clear, business-like approach that did not require the shedding of blood also blended well with the rational sensibilities of the 18th-century mind. Piracy was presumed to be one of the many risks that attended foreign trade. If one could buy protection, even from the rogues themselves, how was this so different from insuring a ship?s cargo against a natural calamity? So the logic ran: America?s interests could be satisfied, and its honor assuaged, if common ground could be found between the pirates and their victims.

And so it happened that agreements were reached between the United States and rulers of the Barbary Coast. In exchange for cash payments, the rulers pledged to guarantee the safe passage of American ships and to put a stop to the practice of maritime kidnapping. As the 18th-century came to a close, Americans were cautiously optimistic that they had solved the Barbary problem.

By 1801, however, it became clear that the policy of appeasement had failed. The Pasha of Tripoli, who five years earlier had been satisfied with a payment of $56,000, now demanded increasingly larger sums. When they were not forthcoming, piracy resumed. The same held true for the other Barbary states. The Algerians received payments from the U.S. totaling $990,000 plus another $585,000 in 1793 to cover the ransom of 11 American ships. At the same time, the Bey of Tunis received $50,000. These were extraordinary sums for a nation with a budget of no more than $7 million, but the appetite of the Muslim states seemed to grow evermore insatiable.

As America soon learned, a policy of accommodation only encouraged the brigands of the Barbary Coast to seize more ships and to take more captives. Far from providing safe passage to American and other foreign vessels, the North African rulers remained active accomplices to the crime of piracy, taking protection money while at the same time permitting the banditry to continue.

Things were to change, however, with the election of Thomas Jefferson. In addition to his reputation as an author, scholar and principal architect of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson also was an outspoken opponent of the practice of tribute. He saw it not only as an affront to the nation?s dignity, but also as an ineffectual response to an abhorrent practice. He argued that ultimately the policy of appeasement would fail because, in conveying weakness, it also encouraged further treachery. He was right.

Jefferson?s response to renewed attacks on American shipping was swift and uncompromising. He dispatched a squadron of three frigates and one sloop to the region. They were ordered to observe the deteriorating situation and provide whatever escort was needed to ensure the safety of American merchant vessels. By the time the frigates arrived, Yusuf Karamanli, the Bey of Tripoli, had declared war on the United States.

For the next two years the U.S. Navy conducted running operations against the Barbary pirates, attacking their corsairs and bombarding the coastal forts that sheltered them. The battle cry, ?millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute? (a slogan first used during the XYZ affair of 1798), resonated with a public tired of being held hostage to bandits and oriental potentates.

The U.S. made repeated efforts to bring an honorable end to the fighting, but each was spurned by a defiant Karamanli, apparently convinced tha the U.S. had neither the stamina nor the pluck for a prolonged war. This could not have been farther from the truth.

Before long, Jefferson ordered the U.S.S. Constitution to the Mediterranean in an effort to force an end to the conflict. Setting sail in 1803, the ship was soon in the waters off of Tripoli where its powerful cannon were trained on the fortifications that protected Tripoli harbor. Buildings housing the Pasha?s stores, barracks and powder magazines were razed. His palace was laid waste.

The fighting during these days saw many acts of heroism that established the U.S. Navy as a force to be reckoned with. A daring raid by Lieutenant Stephen Decatur and 74 men led to the destruction of the captured frigate U.S.S. Philadelphia in Tripoli harbor. In another military action, the U.S.S. Intrepid was loaded with gunpowder, sailed into Tripoli harbor and exploded amid a multitude of the Pasha?s ships.

Then, in 1805, the Constitution supported the landing of Marines ?on the shores of Tripoli? in an action that was subsequently immortalized in the Marine Corps hymn. The Americans and their allies destroyed the harbor citadel at Derna that served as the headquarters for the pirates.

Ultimately, Karamanli was brought to heel after a plan was hatched by the American consul in Tunis, William Eaton, to unseat the Pasha and turn over control of the country to his older brother, Hemet. Fearing his imminent demise, Karamanli relented and agreed to a treaty that halted raids on American shipping and led to the repatriation of captured American sailors. It also ended all U.S. tribute to the Barbary warlords. The agreement was signed aboard the deck of the U.S.S. Constitution.

For much of the next decade, American merchant shipping passed through the Mediterranean relatively unmolested. A series of raids by the pirates operating out of Algiers led to some minor naval action in 1815, but, effectively, the harassment of American and other western shipping was ended. Firm action and a determined policy had brought an end to America?s first brush with Middle Eastern terrorism.

As Americans struggle to make sense of the terrorism that struck New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, it is instructive to remember the war that first brought the United States into conflict with the countries of the Middle East. Much like today, it was a contest between two cultures, two iron wills and two differing views of the rights of sovereign states. It represented the clash of old tribal societies with the emerging global perspective of a modern, democratic nation. Then, there was no Israel to cloud the picture, oil had yet to be discovered in the Middle East, and there was no American military presence in the region. Nevertheless, it was impossible for the Muslim states along the Barbary Coast to ignore the presence of American merchant vessels innocently plying their way through the Mediterranean.

In the campaign of 1801-1805, it was American technology that proved decisive, allowing the United States to defeat a poorly armed foe with no real ability to project and sustain power. Ours was a victory of persistence over defiance, steeled determination over opportunism. In time these were to become the signature traits of a newly minted American character, one that is slow to anger, but unrelenting when aroused. In both war and diplomacy, it is an approach that has defined this nation ever since its inception.

Now as them, America has discovered that the appeasement of tyrants never leads to the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is instead an open invitation to would-be agggressors to test the waters, probe for vulnerabilities and strikewhen the democratic world lets down its guard. It can be a costly gamble in both lives and treasure.

When diplomacy backed by the payment of tribute no longer satisfied the warlords of the Barbary Coast, the United States was left with little choice but to go to war. As Jefferson once observed: ?Were we to give up half our territory rather than engage in a just war to preserve it, we should not keep the other long.? And he was right.

Two hundred years later, the reality facing the U.S. is much the same. Successive Administrations have worked hard to assuage anti-western feeling in the Middle East, first with promises of trade and technical assistance and later with offers of foreign aid and security pacts. For a time, these efforts succeeded, and Washington found it could cultivate moderate, pro-American regimes throughout the region.

But as history has shown, with time these regimes have become less and less representative of the Muslim street and as a consequence, more vulnerable. In places like Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan, Islamic orthodoxy is once again on the rise, while in Saudi Arabia the ruling family has fallen out of favor with those who believe their opulent lifestyle and close ties to America have corrupted the traditional Wahabi faith. Popular disaffection and feelings of resentment against the West have spawned a new Middle Eastern rage, decidedly more lethal and less localized than that of Karamanli.

For the first time, Middle East terrorists, armed with chemical, biological and possibly radiological weapons, can strike the American homeland and inflict mass casualties on its citizens. Horrific though they were, the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11th could be just the prelude to a far more grim future. In a very real sense, the pirates of old have become the terrorists of today, seeking to score a Lilliputian advantage over an unsuspecting, vulnerable Gulliver.

Once again, America has no choice but to act swiftly and decisively against an enemy that is unwilling to accept coexistence on any plane. In fighting this ?asymmetrical? threat, gunboat diplomacy, applied preemptively if need be, offers the only practical solution. With so much at stake, waiting passively for the next attack is not an option.

Not since Saladin defeated the Crusader Armies at the Horns of Hattin in 1187 has fundamentalist Islam felt it has had the ability to drive the infidel from the Middle East. At its disposal are tools and techniques that once were the exclusive province of the West. Emboldened by successes in Iran, Afghanistan, the Sudan and, most recently, Southern Lebanon, radicals within the Muslim World have had little reason to slow their assault. In fact, they have viewed the West?s timid response to their agitation as an opportunity to grow stronger and ever bolder.

For Osama bin Laden and his cohort, the war in Afghanistan is but the latest in a millennial struggle against the West. It is a drama that will continue to play out across the world now that Middle Eastern terrorism has attained a global reach. In the war now being waged against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, nothing less is at stake than U.S. standing abroad and peace at home. In the fight between tradition and modernity in the Middle East, it is America?s resolve that is being tested.

On the day that American Airlines flight 77 lifted off from Dulles International Airport, bound for a fiery crash into the west side of the Pentagon, a venerable Washington landmark stood quietly against the dawn. Located just a block from the White House, the residence of Lieutenant Stephen Decatur prepared to welcome visitors as it has since 1818. Here, amidst the mementos of an adventurous life, its famed occupant regaled guests with stories of piracy on the high seas, and the heroic deeds he and his crew had performed long ago.

Nearly two hundred years later, and just two miles away, another drama was unfolding. Only this time, Middle Eastern terrorism had come home to America, the pirates were in the skies above, and the heroes were those racing to save their co-workers from an all-consuming darkness. Their efforts, too, will prove not to have been in vain.

Rand Fishbein, Ph.D. is President of Fishbein Associates, Inc., a public-policy consulting firm based in Potomac, Maryland (http://www.fishbeinassociates.com/). He is a former Professional Staff Member (Majority) of both the U.S. Senate Defense Appropriations and Foreign Operations Appropriations subcommittees. Dr. Fishbein also served as a Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI). Dr. Fishbein received his Ph.D. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. This article was first published in The National Interest Magazine.

By Rand H. Fishbein, Ph.D. on Thursday, December 20, 2001

<font color="#000002" size="1">[ March 22, 2004 03:03 PM: Message edited by: Jumper69 ]</font>

[Emperor Napoleon]

same can be said of N. Korea. The Clinton Administration (well intentioned I believe but flawed in its logic) agreed to give N. Korea billions in aid to NOT develop their nuclear program. It was in essense nuclear blackmail. But true to form, blackmailers never stop with one extraction. And now we have a N. Korea with a fully operational nuclear program after having violated their agreements to not do so. Is that President Bush's fault too?

[Raven Soul]

I was going to respond to this thread normally, but when I hit reply this whole little rap popped in my head....

Screw it, if the end is near
Sit back, relax and drink a beer,
The hate in the world is packed pound for pound,
And it will be as long as humanity is around,
You might be asking why I made this rap,
Because I am tired of all this stupid crap,
Terror alerts and innocent civilians dying,
I can't even take anymore, I stopped trying,
Raven displeased with all the crap going on,
So I just sit back and make a crappy song,
Tensions are running to high,
How many more people have to die,
Before we realize the errors of our ways,
Live now because tomorrow is not promised today.

I am so sick of everything going on, I hate watching the news, I hate logging on to Yahoo!. Even a good day, you still get crappy news.

[jumper69]

"But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.

War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there is no substitute for victory.

There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.

Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis."

- Douglas MacArthur, US Congress, April 19 1951

[Emperor Napoleon]

Public opinion post-WWII had the biggest influence on the sacking of MacArthur. Americans were tired of war, tired of "offensives" and wanted to enjoy 1950s prosperity. President Truman had Hiroshima and Nagasaki on his shoulders (conscience) and felt "containment" the better alternative. Likewise, MacArthur was trying to establish a very dangerous principle of subverting the power of POTUS and going directly to Congress. Overall Truman had no choice but to fire Mac.

[LanDroid]

Plus hadn't the Chinese soundly kicked McArthur's ass before he got canned?

Jumper must have one of the strangest email inboxes around... [img]eek.gif[/img]